Cross Border Journal

The Allure of Afghanistan Is Its Challenge

On February 11, I highlighted Afghanistan and its unenviable logistical challenges, noting where the U.S. and coalition forces would be most vulnerable in building a supply chain architecture for success in the country and in competition with their enemies.

Via The Corner and Michael Yon's blog, I found my way to an article from March 22 in the Washington Post on the same topic of logistics in Afghanistan, titled "General Urges Confidence in Ability to Supply Troops in Afghanistan." Before going into the article, I would like to highlight something I wrote on February 11:

"While true that the AOG (armed opposition groups) supply chain sophistication has yet to reach the level of the U.S. military, the U.S. supply chain is far more extended and thus more exposed to instability. This is exacerbated by the fact that the supply chain nodes surrounding Afghanistan exist in countries that are also underdeveloped states (former Soviet states), highly unstable states (Pakistan), or highly insular/hostile states (Iran).

"With the U.S. raising the troop commitment in Afghanistan, it is absolutely necessary that they have the most sophisticated, underlying supply chain architecture in-theater, and that its innovation architecture is geared towards being highly disruptive and destructive when targeting the AOG's own supply chain architectures--physical (bases, training camps, hideouts), financial (cash lines, funding sources), informational (communication and IT), relational (collaborators and partners), innovational (new techniques and training camp programs), and human (recruiting, training and leadership)."

You don't have to be a genius to understand that Afghanistan is a logistician's nightmare. Not only is it tough to provide goods and services across its borders, supply chain architecture is equally difficult to manage within its borders. Taking a look at Google Maps:

As can be seen, Afghanistan is not just landlocked, it is landlocked by a handful of under-developed and/or unstable states. Over-land options are not just limited, they are all less than reliable. The path of least resistance, when air space is cleared by Pakistan, is from the sea by air. Thus, the following quote by Gen. Duncan J. McNabb in Post is the understatement of the year:

"You probably couldn't ask for or find a tougher place from a logistics challenge, of getting the stuff in," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A description of how things are currently managed logistically follows:

"The most successful option has been air delivery. Battle gear -- including arms, ammunition, sensitive equipment, bomb-resistant vehicles and armored personnel carriers -- has been brought into Afghanistan by air, thanks to a Pentagon-funded expansion of air bases at Bagram, Kandahar and Bastian.

"In recent years, the capacity of the bases has been increased by up to 400 percent, and the growth continues. At Bagram air base, for example, the Army Corps of Engineers is managing about $650 million in construction, according to Col. Thomas O'Donovan, commander of the Afghanistan Engineer District.

"The materials for all this construction must be trucked into Afghanistan, since the country has few factories. Cement is brought in from Pakistan, steel from Uzbekistan and other northern neighbors, and manufactured goods such as doors and doorknobs from China or India.

"These trucks also carry food, water, clothing and other personal supplies, typically bringing them from Pakistani ports and into Afghanistan at one of five border crossings. About 130 to 140 shipments reach Afghanistan each day along that route, McNabb said, and because only 78 containers a day are currently needed to keep up with demand, "we're getting more in than we need.""

But tactics by the AOGs have forced U.S. forces to create new options:

"But insurgents have been successful enough at interrupting shipments that McNabb's command is using satellite trackers to look for any sign of attack and to reroute trucks accordingly.

"Meanwhile, "alternative routes to Afghanistan through the Caucasus and Central Asia have become a high priority," McNabb told the senators. The Pentagon has enlisted Russia, China, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in a northern distribution network, and a few dozen shipments have already reached the Afghan capital, Kabul, by that route.

"The hope, he added, is to be "able to bring in about 100 containers from the north a day to supplement" what is imported through Pakistan. "So we have lots of options to get the stuff in."

"However, if all ground routes fail, McNabb said, "if we had to do everything by air, you would see a Berlin airlift.""

As U.S. Forces continue to assist in the build up of Afghanistan's internal infrastructure, it is critical that border security is maintained to the degree that cross-border, ground transport is not only secure but also a feasible option for the supply of goods and services required for Afghanistan to thrive. Success will be a long time coming as long as AOGs are able to:

• maintain freedom of movement across Afghan's border,
• disrupt key, over-land supply routes for U.S. forces, even part of the time,
• and build the architecture necessary to recruit, train, equip and deploy their own forces.

Pondering Afghanistan has led me to believe that its allure to many is exactly its various challenges, the possibility of succeeding in "taming" a country and land where many over history have failed. I personally find it both daunting and exciting, and can understand being susceptible to this allure. I believe we could see many errors ahead if our leaders become too emotionally attached to a particular strategy for definitive success in Afghanistan. In addition, the effort is sure to be doomed if our leaders are only half-committed.

Bangalore Calling

I am in the process of finalizing an April trip to Bangalore. One or more of my Australia colleagues and I will engage in testing with our India colleagues in support of the TMS implementation I currently manage. Although I have spent a good amount of time with the India team on the WMS side, it will be my first time with the TMS India team and I am looking forward to the opportunity. Nothing beats being on-site with the technical team as they go through the development and issues related to an IT deployment half the world away.

My wife and I also have a friend in town and so blogging is much lighter than I anticipated with so much going on. The list of articles I have wanted to comment on is growing fast...

TMS vs. WMS Implementations

My brain needs a recharge this weekend before I can jump back into the ongoing topics I am covering around globalization and the impact the U.S. stimulus will have on supply chains. I am in the middle of getting my head wrapped around implementing a Transportation Management System (TMS) versus a Warehouse Management System (WMS). Because we use a common implementation methodology at Manhattan, most of the key tasks and milestones remain the same. The differences become clearer in the following respects:

• WMS implementations focus on the nodes (warehouses and distribution centers) of a supply chain
• TMS implementations focus on the modes (land transport, ocean vessel, airplane, railway, etc)
• The organization and culture built around a these two distinct products tend to be different
• TMS is more network oriented and outside the four walls of a warehouse or DC, driving very different rollout considerations

Although I worked relatively briefly for a 3PL transportation provider in Japan, managing this implementation is really starting to ingrain in me the key pain points for a transportation provider and how systems should be built to manage those, if not completely eliminate them.

What is particularly exciting is foreseeing the point where I can begin to more fully understand the integration points between a WMS and TMS in providing a more total solution for a customer's supply chain. I already have a conceptual feel for what is required in this integration, but to actually develop the ability to successfully and competently create and execute an implementation that seamlessly integrates the modal and nodal aspects of a supply chain is someting I look forward to achieving.

Maritime Security and Trade in the Asia-Pacific, The Ten Commandments of Globalization

As mentioned in my previous post on this subject, the "Ten Commandments of Globalization" are the key component to Dr. Barnett's military-market nexus concept, and describes the "seam between war and peace." They are again as follows:

(1) Look for resources and ye shall find, but...

(2) No stability, no markets;

(3) No growth, no stability;

(4) No resources, no growth;

(5) No infrastructure, no resources;

(6) No money, no infrastructure;

(7) No rules, no money;

(8) No security, no rules;

(9) No Leviathan, no security; and

(10) No (American) will, no Leviathan.

Understanding how these commandments are currently followed, or in some cases not followed, requires a step back in history to World War II and the conditions that were set to govern security in the Asia-Pacific region.

(10) No (American) will, no Leviathan: Prior to America's engagement in World War II, Japan was providing the will and the Leviathon with oppressive results across the Asia-Pacific. It built up supply chain infrastructure across the region, but with the sole purpose of supporting its dominance in controlling populations, resources and trade. As a result, not only did it undermine growth and stability in areas under control, it also ensured its failure in the attempt to over-extend military reach to U.S. territories.

With its defeat by American will and the American leviathon, Japan fell under the conditions of security that has mostly remained in place through the present day. The force of this American will and leviathon in the Asia-Pacific today is without doubt led by U.S. Pacific Command. The map below helps illustrate how the U.S. Military currently projects its influence in the region, and how existing partnerships and exchanges allow this influence to be extended:

*Taiwan is included under "Key Allies/Partners" in the sense that the U.S. has continually supplied them with weapons and weapons systems that are meant to help maintain a peaceful status quo with mainland China.

In essence, the "American leviathon" is generally an accepted presence in the Asia-Pacific, comprising of extended resources deployed by allies and partners. Countries like China and Indonesia enhance the effect of this leviathon by accepting its presence to the degree that military exchanges occur and a status quo is agreed upon.

(9) No Leviathan, no security: With the American leviathon's influence solidly permeated across the Asia-Pacific, security has been well-maintained and the only two key, traditionally recognized hotspots relatively contained: the Taiwan Straits and the DMZ between North and South Korea. The Taiwan Straits have cooled down significantly, but I will discuss these areas of risk at another point and where they fit into the security concerns of supply chain managers.

(8) No security, no rules: The security that has gradually swept across the Asia-Pacific since World War II has resulted in the majority of nations engaged in organizations such as the WTO and ASEAN, while a significant mass of bilateral trade agreements and/or economic partnerships have been entered into within the Asia-Pacific:

 *Lines in red denote existing bilateral trade agreements and economic partnerships; lines in blue denote agreements that are under negotiation and/or formal consideration. Agreements between individual countries and ASEAN have been left out.

(7) No rules, no money: With so many nations in the Asia-Pacific participating in multiple "rule sets" in the form of bilateral and/or multilateral agreements, it is no wonder that money flows have increased.

Of course, without much further explanation required, this leads to the components of the remaining commandments: infrastructure, resources, growth, stability and markets. So if we want to discuss the parts of the Asia-Pacific where supply chain managers would have the most security concerns, we only have to look where the rules (i.e. rule sets) are weakest. This will be the main topic of my next post in this series.

Lockheed Crafting Itself as Solutions Provider for the Military

The WSJ has an article on how Lockheed has won a US$5 billion deal to essentially provide supply chain solutions to U.S. Special Forces Command. This news really highlights what Dr. Thomas Barnett has been saying about the company's transformation the past few years through some strategic acquisitions, particularly Pacific Architects & Engineers.

As the article states, Lockheed is able to open up itself to new areas of services by crafting itself as a solutions provider rather than a weapon systems provider:

"The contract also covers information-technology work as well as maintenance, repair and overhaul work on planes, helicopters and ground vehicles used by commando units. The mandate is also potentially broad enough that Lockheed could offer other services through the contract."

Up front, the work is likely to be modes and nodes heavy--transport and facilities focused--but those who read this blog understand that the true value is the sophistication and quality of service provided in IT-driven supply chain intelligence, innovation, relationship management and ensuring the U.S. Special Forces Command personnel have exceptional people deployed in their supply chain to drive mission success--especially considering how extended (hot spots with weak infrastructures supplied via multiple countries) and lean (smaller, more regularly disbursed and mobile) special forces operate.

Update: This article details Lockheed's deployment of Kinaxis Inc.'s RapidResponse solution.

"Great Powers" with Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett and Hugh Hewitt, Part 4

Part 4 of Dr. Thomas Barnett's discussion of "Great Powers" with Hugh Hewitt is now posted. Since I am in the process of writing about maritime security and trade in the Asia-Pacific, the following exchange stood out most to me (highlights mine):

HH: All right, well then, I’ll look for it later in the week. Let me conclude by the most controversial recommendation in the diplomatic realignment chapter, which is for military to military cooperation between us and the BRIC quarter, which is Brazil, Russia, India and China. Now Brazil and India, you betcha, and we’re already doing a lot with India. But really? Military to military cooperation with China and Russia, Dr. Barnett? Why and won’t they steal everything we show them? 

TPMB: Oh, they’re going to steal a bunch of stuff in terms of technology. Global defense…the defense industry has gone global a long time ago, so that cow’s already out the barn. Typically, though, when we interact with them, we found this with the Russians in the early 90s and the Chinese now, what they’re really interested in is figuring out how to professionalize their force, how to do paychecks, how to keep people educated and motivated in their careers. I mean, they’re really looking for a lot of baseline stuff. And they’re obviously copying us, because we’re the Microsoft of militaries. I want them to have strong, professional militaries. I want them to be confident in using them distant from their shores, because I need help. I can’t do all this stuff by myself, and the Europeans won’t come along with me to do it anymore. So I’m trying to deal with the economic reality of how I’ve gotten this world to the point of accepting markets over the vast majority of the world’s surface, but we don’t have the political institutions to go along with it, so I need some help in dealing with the natural tumult and the conflicts overwhelmingly intra-country that are going to occur as this thing spreads forward. So I’m asking you, the reader, basically, if you really believe in markets, if you really believe in what we’ve achieved in terms of this international liberal trade order, becoming the West, becoming global economy, becoming globalization, then you’re going to have to trust that the market evolution in these countries that I’m asking you to consider as long term strategic allies is going to work. And you’re going to see pluralism over time. If you don’t believe that, then you’re likely to go down the pathway of not only trying to manage the world, but simultaneously hold off the rise of these great powers. And history tells me that’s just too much for the United States to pull off, and we’re going to be really frustrated and thwarted in those efforts.

Obviously, strong military to military exchanges will be required for a maritime security regime to be successful in the Asia-Pacific. Just how such a regime is configured will rely on all participants understanding that the over-arching goal is for trade (globalization) to continue unfettered towards uplifting the well-being of the people in the region.

Low-Hanging Fruit in Improving Your Global (China) Supply Chain

Dan at China Law Blog has posted an article on how to improve a global (China) supply chain in the face of the world's current challenges. The recommendations are quite practical and can be relatively quickly deployed, and thus are "low-hanging fruit" improvements. I would also recommend that firms reinforce their commitment to their employees and a high-quality work environment that fosters innovative practices across the supply chain. If employee morale and motivation is low in an uncertain economic environment, new shifts in strategy and/or tactics may falter in execution.